














Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and 
































Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and  











  hen David Sanger1 and Ellen Nakashima2 officially broke the news 
that the United States and Israel had been involved in a long-term collabo-
rative cyber operation focused on Iran and its nuclear development capa-
bilities, they only confirmed what many had assumed for some time.3 In 
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fact, with the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010, many scholars and practitioners 
had speculated on whether the use of the Stuxnet malware, if State spon-
sored, amounted to a “use of force” or even an “armed attack” under the 
UN Charter paradigm.4 
Some even began to consider the hypothetical legality of Stuxnet-type 
cyber actions within an armed conflict as opposed to a use of force or 
armed attack that would initiate an armed conflict. For these writers, the 
major issues revolved around the cyber tool’s compliance with the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC) and principles such as discrimination and propor-
tionality. For example, Jeremy Richmond analyzed Stuxnet in light of these 
principles and concluded that whoever designed the malware did so with 
the clear intent to comply with the LOAC.5 
Even prior to the discovery of Stuxnet, a group of legal and technical 
experts6 were gathered by the Estonian Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence to draft a manual, known as the Tallinn Manual on the Interna-
tional Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.7 The Manual explores the international 
law governing the use of force—in both its jus ad bellum and jus in bello as-
pects8—as applied to cyber operations conducted by States and non-State 
actors. Several key principles arose during the Manual discussions in rela-
tion to the principles of proportionality and precautions in and against at-
tack, including a number of challenging aspects in applying these principles 
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to cyber warfare. This article will discuss some of those interesting chal-
lenges.  
Part II of the article will focus on the constant-care standard and how it 
applies to all cyber operations. Part III will look at the principle of propor-
tionality with specific focus on the idea of indirect effects. Part IV analyzes 
the issue of feasibility with the precautionary standards. Part V analyzes 
State responsibilities under the obligation to take precautions against the 




Before embarkation on the above-mentioned analysis, some brief com-
ments are necessary concerning the definition of “attack.” With the excep-
tion of Part II, which deals with the constant-care standard, the legal stand-
ards discussed below apply to an “attack.” Many LOAC principles apply 
only to situations of attack, such as the principle of proportionality. The 
idea of taking precautions in the attack assumes that there is an attack. The 
fundamental nature of “attack” underlies many of the LOAC principles 
that govern cyber warfare, making it important to come to some under-
standing of the meaning of the word. 
Paul Walker was one of the first to address this issue directly, in his ar-
ticle “Rethinking Computer Network ‘Attack.’”9 He notes that the word 
“attack” is defined in the 1977 Additional Protocol I (API) to the Geneva 
Conventions as “acts of violence” and states that this definition has be-
come customarily binding even on non-parties to the Protocol.10 As a re-
sult, Walker argues that very few activities in cyber warfare will actually 
amount to an attack and will therefore not be governed by the principles of 
attack, such as proportionality. 
The meaning of “attack” was also vigorously debated by Michael 
Schmitt,11 Chairman of the International Law Department of the U.S. Na-
val War College and leader of the Tallinn Manual project, and Knut Dör-
mann, representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
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(ICRC).12 In Schmitt’s view, an attack is something that results in death, 
damage, destruction or injury. Dörmann argued that anything that was 
aimed at civilians amounted to an “attack.” These views tend to mark the 
extremes of the debate. The Tallinn Manual softened Schmitt’s view some-
what by indicating that a cyber attack need not be characterized by the re-
lease of kinetic force.13 
Resolving the debate on the definition of attack may need to wait for 
more State practice. It is enough for this article to state that most of the 
law discussed here presupposes an “attack,” whatever that means. For ex-
ample, in the absence of an attack, commanders are not required to apply 
the principle of proportionality. 
 
B. State and Non-State Actors 
 
In addition to the definition of “attack,” another important consideration is 
the involvement of non-State actors in cyber operations. One of the most 
intriguing aspects of cyber operations is that they allow non-State actors to 
relatively easily harness State-level violence. This undermines the Westpha-
lian monopoly on the use of violence as few other weapon systems have 
done. 
Other articles in this volume will address this question more directly,14 
so little need be said here except to note that many of the standards dis-
cussed below only apply to States. To the extent that some organized 
armed groups might elect to be bound by LOAC principles, they would 
also be bound, but as a matter of law the majority of the discussion below 
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II. THE “CONSTANT-CARE” STANDARD 
 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I is titled “Precautions in the Attack”15 
and is generally believed to be binding on States in both international 
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.16 However, the first 
subparagraph takes a much broader approach than just “attack.” It states 
that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”17 The ICRC 
Commentary adds, “The term ‘military operations’ should be understood to 
mean any movements, manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried 
out by the armed forces with a view to combat.”18 
The term “military operations” is obviously meant to be much broader 
than the term “attack” and imposes a general legal requirement on militar-
ies even when not attacking. The legal requirement is to exercise “constant-
care,” but that term is not defined either in Article 57, the ICRC Commen-
tary or generally in the LOAC. While the exact application of this principle 
in a specific military operation must be left to the commander, it seems 
clear that exercising constant care would at least mean that a commander 
cannot ignore effects on civilian population. 
In the context of cyber operations, constant care would likely require a 
commander to maintain situational awareness at all times, including all 
                                                                                                                      
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
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tions”).  
17. API, supra note 15, art. 57.1. 













phases of the operation. When employing a cyber tool or conducting cyber 
operations, the commander would need to maintain oversight of the tool 
and be ready to adjust operations if the tool or operation began to have 
effects that the commander determined would have an illegal impact on 
civilians. This might be especially difficult in the cyber domain since virtu-
ally every cyber operation will traverse, affect, employ or damage civilian 
cyber infrastructure of some kind.19   
A contemporary application of this standard occurred in the case of the 
infamous Stuxnet malware.20 Evidently, it was discretely targeted at Iranian 
nuclear facilities, but reports show that it spread much wider than that, pre-
sumably wider than the United States and Israel21 intended it to dissemi-
nate, which may have led to its discovery. Though no other damage was 
reported, the unintended spread of the virus at least implicates the con-
stant-care standard and informs State practice on the issue. 
 Additionally, it appears that the Stuxnet malware was used in conjunc-
tion with another malware that has been termed “Flame.” Flame was “de-
signed to secretly map Iran’s computer networks and monitor the comput-
ers of Iranian officials, sending back a steady stream of intelligence used to 
enable an ongoing cyberwarfare campaign.”22 Flame was discovered by Ira-
nian officials when Israeli government hackers were carrying out opera-
tions against Iranian oil ministry and export facilities.23  
Similar situations might lead a commander to argue that he cannot con-
tinue to monitor the network in order to exercise constant care for fear of 
being discovered. The LOAC allows no such exception in this case, though 
it does in others.24 Therefore, it seems unlikely that a commander could 
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argue that he was relieved of his legal duty to maintain constant care for 
fear it might lead to discovery. Rather, commanders and all persons con-
ducting cyber operations must recognize and accept the legal obligation to 
exercise constant care in all military operations, including cyber operations.  
 
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
 
The principle of proportionality is found in Article 51(5)(b) of API:25  
 
5.  Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate: 
 
. . . 
 
(b)  an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combi-
nation thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
 
This principle is generally accepted as customary international law in inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts and is analyzed elsewhere in 
great length26 so it needs no further discussion here.  
Few would argue that the principle of proportionality does not apply to 
cyber warfare; instead the controversy centers on its application to specific 
cyber operations.27 While all cyber operations are governed by the con-
stant-care standard, the principle of proportionality will only apply to those 
cyber operations that amount to an “attack.” For those operations where 
the principle of proportionality does apply, two specific aspects of the rule 
deserve more detailed analysis: the understanding of “damage” and the 
problem of indirect effects. 
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Preliminarily, it is important to keep in mind that civilians can never be 
made the object of attack28 and that the principle of proportionality limits 
commanders when, as the result of a lawful attack, civilians or civilian ob-
jects may be harmed. In order for such an attack to be lawful, the com-
mander must determine that the death, injury and damage are not “exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 
Though cyber attacks will inevitably have the ability to kill and injure civil-
ians, the vast majority of known cyber operations have focused on or re-
sulted in damage, hence the focus on the damage element of the legal 
standard. 
Additionally, the requirement that the damage occur to civilian objects 
should be understood broadly. The vast majority of the Internet, including 
the cables, servers and routers, consists of civilian objects, which are 
owned, operated and maintained by civilians. Any damage to these ele-
ments of the Internet infrastructure would be considered civilian damage 
for purposes of the proportionality analysis.  
Finally, although the drafters of 1977 Additional Protocol I certainly 
did not anticipate cyber warfare, they did recognize that electronic advanc-
es in technology would affect the way wars would be fought and their po-
tential impacts on civilians. In the Commentary, the ICRC notes, “It was also 
pointed out that modern electronic means made it possible to locate mili-
tary objectives, but that they did not provide information on the presence 
of civilian elements within or in the vicinity of such objectives.”29 Though 
perhaps not entirely true in cyber warfare, this idea certainly impacts the 
application of proportionality to cyber attacks. 
  
A. Damage to Civilian Objects 
 
When considering kinetic weapons that result in heat, blast and fragmenta-
tion, the issue of defining damage is less controversial. However, when 
cyber tools are used to conduct an attack, determining what cyber actions 
amount to damage becomes more problematic. There are several ap-
proaches in determining what equates to damage in the cyber domain.  
One approach would be to analogize from a kinetic attack and argue 
that if what occurs from a cyber operation would have been considered 
damage if accomplished by kinetic means, then the attack amounts to dam-
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age. The advantage to this approach is that it places commanders in a com-
fortable position to apply known factors. Commanders have been applying 
the proportionality analysis to kinetic attacks their entire careers and will 
likely feel quite comfortable with this analysis.  
However, there are many cyber actions that would not look at all like 
the results of a kinetic attack. For example, simply closing a computer’s 
specific communication port normally used to communicate with another 
computer, while leaving the rest of the computer function untouched, is 
not a similar effect to what might be caused by a kinetic attack. Using the 
kinetic analogy approach, an extremely limited number of cyber attacks 
would cause damage. 
Alternatively, one could take the view that any unauthorized intrusion 
into a computer or computer system results in a change to the computer or 
system and therefore equates to damage.30 In other words, the digital 
changes required to allow penetration into a computer would be damage 
under the principle of proportionality. This view would require a com-
mander to essentially consider any effects on a computer system in his 
proportionality analysis.  
This seems to go too far. The principle of proportionality was clearly 
not designed to exclude the possibility of any civilian casualties or damage, 
but only that which was excessive.31 
Finally, some have taken the view that damage also encompasses seri-
ous interruptions in functionality, such as would require replacing parts or 
reloading software systems. For example, in the kinetic analogy used above 
where a cyber attack shut down a communication port but left the rest of 
the computer unaffected, the computer would still turn on but its actual 
functionality might be seriously affected. If functionality is considered 
when determining damage, the kinetic analogy would be of limited value.  
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ture can reasonably be regarded as uses of force, whether or not they cause immediate 
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The functionality approach seems to be the best application of the 
proportionality rule to the cyber realm as it takes into account the unique 
aspects of cyber operations, without going so far as to make the propor-
tionality analysis unwieldy for commanders to apply. Armed conflict has 
always included effects on civilians that have caused inconvenience, irrita-
tion, stress and fear, but these have traditionally not been part of the com-
mander’s analysis of damage required by the proportionality analysis.32 By 
focusing on functionality, the commanders can easily understand the legal 
standard and apply it to modern cyber operations.  
 
B. Indirect Effects 
 
Gauging indirect effects in cyber warfare may prove to be one of the most 
difficult issues in applying proportionality. It is clear that a commander 
must consider the direct effects of his cyber attack. These direct effects are 
defined as the “immediate, first order consequences, unaltered by interven-
ing events or mechanisms.”33 In the cyber domain, this would include the 
effects on a computer that is shut down by a cyber attack or the damage to 
the centrifuges caused by the Stuxnet malware. 
In contrast to direct effects, indirect effects are “the delayed and/or 
displaced second-, third-, and higher-order consequences of action, created 
through intermediate events or mechanisms.”34 In the cyber domain, this 
would include damage that was not the intent of the attack, but that result-
ed from elements of the attack. In the case of Stuxnet, the malware infect-
ed many computers beyond its intended targets within Iran. Whatever 
damage might have resulted from these unintended infections might have 
been indirect effects. Another example might be a targeted attack on a mili-
tary computer system that would shut the system down, but, because of the 
linkages between military and civilian systems, the malware is also likely to 
spread to the civilian systems and shut them down as well. Resulting indi-
                                                                                                                      
32. Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the 
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rect effects are generally accepted as being included in the proportionality 
analysis.35 
Even in the cases mentioned above, for the damage to be considered in 
the proportionality analysis, it must have been expected. Indirect effects 
which were not expected to be excessive are not factored into the analy-
sis.36 In other words, this standard does not anticipate that a reviewer can 
come after the fact and assess the reasonableness of the commander’s deci-
sion on the excessiveness of the indirect effects. Rather, any reviewer must 
assess the reasonableness of the commander’s decision based on what the 
commander reasonably expected the effects to be, given the information he 
had at the time.37 
Considerations of expected effects have already affected known mili-
tary operations. In the 2003 U.S. attacks on Iraq, cyber attackers for the 
United States considered attacking Saddam Hussein’s financial accounts in 
an attempt to pressure him. The attacks were called off, however, when it 
was determined that the attacks would probably affect the European bank-
ing system and have negative repercussions.38 
Similar considerations would have to be made in the case that a pro-
spective malware targeting military objectives was to be implemented via a 
portable storage device. The commander would have to determine whether 
or not the potential transfer of that same malware to civilian systems was 
expected, and then consider how much damage it was expected to cause. 
On the other hand, if that same malware was unexpectedly transferred into 
civilian systems, the commander would not be responsible for having mis-
applied the principle of proportionality. 
A commander’s ability to properly apply this rule is obviously tied back 
to the earlier discussion on constant care. Unless a commander is constant-
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ly mapping and monitoring the targeted computer or network, he will not 




The legal standard of feasibility appears in several places in the “Precau-
tions in Attack” section of API39 and applies to most types of attacks.40 In 
various provisions, a commander must do “everything feasible”41 or “take 
all feasible precautions.”42 During the ratification process, there was great 
debate about the term “feasible” and what it meant.43 A number of repre-
sentatives to the negotiating convention made specific comments about the 
meaning “feasible” was to have when applied as a legal standard. John 
Redvers Freeland, the head of the United Kingdom delegation, through 
several sessions stated that the words “to the maximum extent feasible” 
related to what was “workable or practicable, taking into account all the 
circumstances at a given moment, and especially those which had a bearing 
on the success of military operations.”44 Similarly, S.H. Bloembergen, a del-
egate from the Netherlands, stated that “feasible” should be “interpreted as 
referring to that which was practicable or practically possible, taking into 
account all circumstances at the time.”45 As a result, “feasible” is generally 
understood to mean that which is “practicable or practically possible, tak-
ing into account all circumstances ruling at the time.”46  
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A. “Practicable or Practically Possible” 
 
During the API negotiations mentioned above, the national representatives 
were anxious to set a standard that would require diligence on the part of 
the commander, but would not be one with which it was beyond his capa-
bility to comply. The resulting language of practicality was the eventual 
resolution, which seems to be a workable standard in applying precautions 
in the attack. 
The application of “feasibility” to cyber attacks seems ultimately tied to 
technology. As a commander contemplates a potential cyber attack, his 
“feasible precautions” should require him to sufficiently map the networks 
to determine the effects of the attack, particularly on civilians and civilian 
objects. This is much like the duty of constant care, but should carry a 
heightened specificity when planning a specific attack. 
If in the process of preparing a cyber attack, the commander is unable 
to determine the extent of the attack’s effects, he cannot launch an attack 
that would otherwise be considered indiscriminate.  Or, if an attacker is 
unable to gather sufficient information as to the nature of a proposed tar-
get system, he should limit the attack to only those parts of the system for 
which he does have sufficient information to verify their status as lawful 
targets. In other words, the feasibility limitation should not be used as a 
justification for conducting an attack. 
 
B. Circumstances Ruling at the Time 
 
Without detracting from the duty of constant care previously discussed, the 
commander’s duty to do what is feasible is limited by his circumstances. 
This limitation on commanders’ liability stems from the post-World War II 
prosecution of German general Lothar Rendulic.47 General Rendulic con-
ducted a scorched-earth policy in Finnmark to slow what he thought were 
swiftly advancing Russian troops. In the end, the Russians were not coming 
as quickly as Rendulic had thought and the destruction proved to be un-
necessary. However, the Military Tribunal determined that the legal stand-
ard was “consideration to all factors and existing possibilities” as they “ap-
peared to the defendant at the time.”48  
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This same standard should apply to the understanding of “feasibility” 
in cyber attacks. While commanders are required to do everything practica-
ble, the responsibility is limited to the circumstances as the commander 
knows them at the time. For example, if a commander has used his best 
technology to map a network and exercises continuous monitoring in 
preparation for the attack, he has not violated the law if, during the course 
of the attack, the malware spreads unexpectedly to a civilian network that 
the commander did not know was linked to the military system. 
 
V. PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF ATTACKS 
 
In addition to considering precautions when conducting attacks, nations 
have an obligation to take precautions against the potential effects of at-
tacks.49 Unlike the provisions discussed above that govern the conduct of 
attacks, this standard is not only a wartime standard. Rather, it is a standard 
that applies to nations during peacetime, in anticipation that armed conflict 
might arise in the future that would affect civilians and civilian objects. 
Article 58 reads:  
 
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: 
 
(a)  Without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, en-
deavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians 
and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of mili-
tary objectives; 
(b)  Avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populat-
ed areas; 
(c)  Take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their 
control against the dangers resulting from military operations.50 
 
This provision of the law is binding on nations only in international 
armed conflict, and is considered part of customary international law.51 The 
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cyber aspects of Article 58 have been thoroughly discussed recently.52 It is 
sufficient here to say that it establishes two layers of responsibility. Initially, 
a nation has the obligation to segregate its military objectives from civilians 
and civilian objects. Second, for those military objectives that it cannot seg-
regate, the nation has a responsibility to protect the civilians and civilian 
objects from the anticipated effects of attacks. 
Importantly, those who wrote this provision of API discussed in some 
detail the difficulty of accomplishing this standard. The inclusion of the 
caveat “to the maximum extent feasible” was the basis of much discussion 
and was purposely added in a way to apply to the entire provision, meaning 
that both the segregate and protect requirements are limited by the feasibil-
ity of any required actions.53 This is also reflected by the ICRC in the Com-
mentary, which states that “it is clear that precautions should not go beyond 
the point where the life of the population would become difficult or even 
impossible.”54 
One more important point is worth noting before discussing the obli-
gations in detail. The title of Article 58 specifically refers to “attacks”; how-
ever, Article 58(c) refers to “operations,” which cover a much broader 
spectrum of cyber activities. There is no doubt that the provisions dis-
cussed below, even those under the heading of “Protect,” apply to precau-
tions against potential cyber attacks, but the extent to which these provi-
sions apply to operations is unclear, particularly for State parties to API. 
For nations like the United States who are not parties and are only bound 
by this article to the extent that it reflects customary international law, it 
seems clear that the customary aspect of this rule applies only to “attacks” 
and not all operations. The news is replete with examples of attacks on mil-
itary objectives that impact civilian infrastructure and systems, and no 
States appear to have accepted the obligation to protect these targets.55 
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53. Official Records, supra note 43, at 199. 
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It is clear that this rule was originally written with a very “geographic” fo-
cus that is hard to translate to the cyber domain. Segregating a military ar-
maments storage facility is geographically easier than segregating digital 
military communications. In fact, estimates of the U.S. Department of De-
fense digital traffic that traverses civilian-owned and -operated infrastruc-
ture are between 90 and 98 percent.56 There is certainly still a geographic 
aspect to the rule, even in the cyber domain, but there is also a virtual loca-
tion aspect to the provision. 
The distinction between the virtual and geographic natures of this rule 
in its application to cyber operations is exemplified by the difference be-
tween cyber infrastructure and digital communications. A nation can com-
ply with the geographic nature of the requirement by positioning servers 
and other military cyber equipment away from civilian areas. Similarly, a 
nation could conceivably create a separate cyber infrastructure backbone 
upon which its military cyber communications would traverse, effectively 
segregating it from civilian infrastructure. This has obviously not been the 
practice of States to this point. 
Rather, the ubiquitous nature of the cyber domain has made it almost 
impossible to segregate potential military objectives from civilian objects 
even in a geographic sense. Consider air traffic control centers and other 
major civilian transportation control centers, as well as power generation 
facilities. All of these serve both civilian and military purposes and are 
clearly cyber targets, but they are also virtually impossible to segregate. 
State practice in this area has at least demonstrated that nations have not 
found such segregation to be feasible. 
In fact, many militaries seem to be moving in the exact opposite direc-
tion and co-locating an ever greater percentage of their cyber infrastructure 
with civilian infrastructure. A good example of this is the movement of 
military and government data to the “cloud.”57 While this move is heralded 
as providing great financial savings, it is unclear whether the legal obliga-
                                                                                                                      
56. See McConnell, supra note 19. 
57. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CLOUD COMPU-
TING STRATEGY (2012), available at http:/www.defense.gov/news/DoDCloudComputing 
Strategy.pdf; John Keller, U.S. Military Begins Moving Its Information Technology (IT) Infrastruc-













tion of segregation of military objectives was ever considered as part of the 




Given the difficulty of segregating military objectives from civilians and 
civilian objects in the cyber domain, the subsequent duty to protect civil-
ians and civilian objects from the indirect effects of attacks on non-
segregable military objectives becomes very important. The caveat of feasi-
bility applies equally to this portion of the legal obligation, but the descrip-
tive wording of “maximum extent” must also be allowed to have some 




The requirement to protect does not encompass every potential cyber in-
convenience or irritation. Rather, it applies only to “dangers” that might 
result from military operations. While this term is not defined in API, it 
seems reasonable to equate this standard to that used in the proportionality 
analysis discussed above, i.e., death or injury to civilians and damage to ci-
vilian objects.  
Therefore, the protection obligation would not apply to cyber opera-
tions such as a denial of service attack that prevents access to a website or 
the altering of a website to change its appearance or connecting links. In-
stead, the obligation to protect should be understood to protect civilians 
and civilian objects from death or injury and destruction, such as shutting 
down air traffic control systems or power systems, which would result in 
serious effects on civilians. 
 
2. “Under Their Control” 
 
Another aspect of this rule that limits its general application is the use of 
the words “under their control.” The plain reading of the obligation makes 
it clear that governments are not expected to protect all civilians and civil-
ian objects from the effects of attacks, but only those which fall under the 
government’s control. 
As with the general rule, this particular provision was originally con-
ceived territorially. In the drafting debates, the Canadian representative, 













guage of “authority” to “control” to make clear the de facto nature of the 
obligation.58 The change was accepted and the obligation amended. In the 
cyber context, the de facto nature of the rule has significant impact. A gov-
ernment might claim that it does not have authority over most of the cyber 
infrastructure due to the various legal regimes that exist within the nation. 
However, under the de facto standard, if the party can dictate the opera-
tions of a civilian computer system, it is under the control of that party and 
the duty to segregate or protect applies. 
 
3. Specific Measures 
 
The ICRC Commentary to Article 58 suggests examples of specific measures 
that a nation could take to fulfill its obligations under the rule, including 
providing well-trained civil defense forces, systems for warnings of im-
pending attacks, and responsive fire and emergency services.59 Analogizing 
these suggestions to the cyber world would suggest actions such as provid-
ing or requiring protective software products, monitoring networks and 
systems and providing warnings of impending or ongoing attacks, and 
providing technical assistance to repair networks or reroute them to alter-
native systems that continue to maintain functionality. 
The U.S. government has already started to take some of these actions, 
though the extent to which it is taking them as a result of its legal obliga-
tion is unclear. For example, the United States has recently started the De-
fense Industrial Base Pilot Program, which is now expanding.60 Under the 
program, specific industries providing defense services that make them le-
gitimate targets in an armed conflict must meet certain cybersecurity re-
quirements in order to do business with the government. Additionally, they 
receive some cyber assistance as a result of their membership in the pro-
gram.   
Additionally, the U.S. government recently stated that it will warn in-
dustries when they appear to be the target of an attack in an attempt to put 
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them on notice so they can increase their security posture.61 Interestingly, 
the cyber giant Google has also recently announced that it will provide 
warnings to clients that appear to be the target of “State” hacking opera-
tions.62 While Google certainly does not have any legal obligation under 
Article 58 to do so, it is interesting to note the sense that there is a need for 
such warnings. 
Finally, the recent coordination between Google and the National Se-
curity Agency after the former was the victim of attacks from the Chinese 
government63 may foreshadow an emerging cyber era where the govern-
ment not only provides warning information, but then works closely to 
remediate and potentially retaliate for State-sponsored cyber activities that 
affect key civilian industries. 
As a closing point to this part, it is important to note that a nation’s in-
ability or failure to fulfill its obligations under Article 58 does not affect an 
adversary’s legal ability to conduct cyber attacks, so long as those attacks 




Cyber warfare is governed by the LOAC, and the LOAC does a generally 
good job of regulating cyber operations. In most cases, the existing law 
provides a clear paradigm to govern cyber activities; however, there are 
several areas where governments and military operators might question 
how to apply the LOAC to a specific cyber operation. This article has high-
lighted a few areas where additional clarity would be useful, such as in the 
cases of the definition of attack, the details of applying constant care, and 
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the required precautions against the effects of attacks. As the discussion on 
these issues increases, particularly spurred by the Tallinn Manual, and as 
State actions in cyberspace inevitably increase, State practice will provide 
nuance to the application of the LOAC that will allow clearer definition on 
the use of cyber operations in armed conflict.  
 
